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EU Housing Markets: 
The Role of Institutional Factors  
 
 
 
Abstract 
Using cluster analysis this study reveals significant heterogeneity in the institutional 
characteristics of European mortgage markets. Distinct clusters are formed which can be 
related to differences in the mortgage credit system, the relative importance of the 
owner-occupation and the property specific fiscal system. The paper then tests for 
multiple structural breaks. We find evidence that structural breaks in European housing 
markets often coincide with a changes in housing market policy. 
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EU Housing Markets: 
The Role of Institutional Factors  
 
1. Introduction 
The turmoil in the world’s financial system observed during the 2007-9 financial 
crisis has heightened interest in housing markets and their importance both financially 
and economically. Beyond the natural policy considerations that arose following the 
crisis, there has been a growing awareness in the importance of assessing the effects of 
changes in property prices on a variety of issues. These include consumption decisions, 
given the predominance of housing in overall household wealth (Campbell & Cocco, 
2007; Muellbauer & Murphy, 2008) and also the impact on the broad banking and 
financial sector given the proportion of bank loan portfolios that residential mortgage 
loans comprise (Martins et al. 2014).  
This paper builds upon the existing literature in considering how the institutional 
characteristics of national residential mortgage markets may affect house prices. A 
number of studies, including Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004), Calza et al. (2007) and Miles & 
Pillonca (2008), all point to significant heterogeneity in the institutional characteristics 
of national mortgage market
1
. Calza et al. (2007) report that “this heterogeneity is 
particularly evident within the euro area, where mortgage lending remains a 
predominantly domestic business activity, largely reflecting natural traditions and 
cultural factors as well as the institutional settings of the local banking sector”. The 
authors point out as examples of these diverging institutional features, the typical 
mortgage contract duration, the required level of down-payment, degree of innovation 
and development of the capital market and the type of interest-rate structure of 
mortgage contracts (variable or fixed interest rate). Maclennan et al. (1998) and ECB 
(2003), among others, point out the differences present in the rental market, mortgage 
credit system and in transaction costs as factors that aid in explaining the differences 
observed in the volatility of house prices across EU countries. Van den Noord (2003) 
extends that analysis by illustrating how house price volatility within the Eurozone 
appears to be related, at least in part, to differences in tax treatment of owner-occupied 
housing
2
. The analysis contained in these papers primarily consists of surveys of 
institutional differences across countries, without either a corresponding detailed 
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examination of the effects on house prices dynamics (McCrone & Stephens, 1995; 
Maclennan et al., 1998 and ECB, 2003) or the study of the how a restricted set of 
institutional characteristics may impact the market (Van den Noord, 2003; Tsatsaronis 
& Zhu, 2004). Whilst a large number of studies have compared the behaviour of 
housing markets in different countries (e.g. Holmans, 1994;, Englund & Ioannides, 
1997; Iacoviello, 2000; Calza et al., 2007; Miles & Pillonca, 2008; Adams & Fuss, 
2010) only Calza et al. (2007) examines the role of a restricted set of institutional 
characteristics relating to the financial system and the corresponding effects of 
monetary policy on consumption and housing prices. Calza et al. (2007) analyses the 
effects of monetary policy shocks on consumption and housing prices, noting 
significant variation in both the timing and strength of those effects across different 
countries. In particular, the authors report that the size of the peak effect of a monetary 
policy shock on consumption and real house prices is positively related to indicators of 
development/flexibility in mortgage markets. Such indicators include the mortgages 
debt to GDP ratio; the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the existence of equity release 
products. 
The contribution of this study is thus the identification of institutional 
differences that exist in the housing market and financial institutions across a variety of 
European countries. We base the methodological framework on cluster analysis, 
showing that there are marked differences at the level of institutional characteristics. We 
then consider how this heterogeneity in institutional characteristics can impact house 
prices dynamics through the testing for structural breaks. Whilst there are some papers 
to have considered the issue of structural breaks the literature is sparse, especially in the 
context of multiple structural breaks in Europe. The issue is of relevance and 
importance as institutional factors and policy changes may play an important role in any 
structural breaks observed. To test for multiple structural breaks we use the Bai & 
Perron (1998, 2001 and 2003) framework. We consider possible breaks in both real user 
cost and real price growth. The empirical results not only confirm the presence of 
structural breaks in the majority of cases, but also show that the breaks frequently 
coincide, or are close to, changes in housing policy. However, many of the changes in 
housing policy frequently cited in the literature do not necessarily result in structural 
breaks. It is argued that this may be due to policy changes not resulting in major 
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structural changes or that their impact may have been mitigated by other events or 
policies. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly characterise the 
European housing market, with a special emphasis on the rental and house ownership 
market, mortgage market and tax system. In section 3 we utilise cluster analysis to 
group the markets based upon their institutional characteristics. The fourth section of 
the paper contains the findings from the analysis of structural breaks. Finally, Section 5 
provides concluding comments.  
 
2. EU Housing Markets 
2.1. EU Rental Markets 
Across the EU-15 the proportion of total housing stock that is rented varies quite 
considerably. As displayed in Table 1 the percentage of rented stock ranges from 12% 
to 58%. A variety of factors potentially influence the relative importance of the rental 
sector, including the tax-subsidy system; regulation in the rental sector; the provision of 
social rental accommodation and the regulation and the structure of financial markets. 
In addition, preference for home ownership and expectations for capital gains from 
house price appreciation may also influence the degree of rented stock, specifically in a 
downward direction (ECB, 2003). The result of such factors, both supply and demand 
based, has been that the role of the rental market is relatively marginal in some 
European countries, such as Spain. Indeed, with the exception of Germany, across the 
entire EU-15 the highest proportion of housing stock that can be categorised as privately 
rented is 26% for Denmark and Luxembourg. The rental market can act as a regulating 
valve, attenuating extreme house price appreciation (DiPasquale & Wheaton, 1992). In 
contrast, countries such as Spain, Ireland, U.K. and Finland, with a higher percentage of 
home ownership and low levels of private rental housing, may experience heightened 
house price volatility.  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
EU governments have frequently acted in response to the reduction in the size, 
and quality of the market for rented dwellings. This response has often been in the 
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context of relaxation in rent regulations. There are three fundamental aspects in rent 
control systems (ECB 2003):  
(i) The existence of regulations governing how the initial rent in a multi-year 
rental contract will change in the future. In many countries the rent is 
indexed to CPI (Consumer Price Index). However, in countries such as 
Germany there is a mechanism that allows the adjustment of rents to recent 
housing market conditions. 
(ii) The existence of some type of control on the initial rent negotiated for a new 
rental contract between a landlord and a tenant. If rents in new contracts 
should reflect market conditions on the passage from the first to the “second 
generation” 
(iii) The existence of regulations governing contracts termination (eviction). 
These elements are considered in the preparation of the index presented in Table 
2 on the typology of property laws: pro-landlord, pro-tenant or neutral law
3
. The table 
shows that in most EU countries the law is strongly pro-tenant. The exceptions are the 
U.K. where the law is pro-landlord and Finland and Greece where property law is 
neutral, i.e. the index shows a value of zero. 
 
2.2. EU Mortgage Markets 
A wide number of papers including, Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004), Calza et al. 
(2007) and Miles & Pillonca (2008), note the existence of significant differences in 
mortgage market institutional characteristics across EU-countries. Tsatsaronis & Zhu 
(2004) classify countries into three groups based on institutional characteristics and 
illustrate that the interaction between bank lending and house prices are affected by 
these features. Key factors that can be used to differentiate markets include: 
(i) Interest-Rate Structure: In particular whether fixed or variable rate mortgage 
products dominate. Variable rates may make housing prices more sensitive to 
changes in short-term rates and thus to monetary policy. 
(ii) Mortgage Equity Withdrawal: The ability of liquidity-constrained agents to 
take advantage of built up increased collateral value.  
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(iii) Valuation and Leverage Practices: These elements aid in the evaluation of 
risk and indicate the degree of prudence maintained in mortgage lending. 
This is turn influences creditors’ appetite for exposure to the market and the 
strength of the credit channel. Important parameters in this respect are the 
existence and level of prudential ceilings on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
that determine the ability of banks to lend against real estate collateral, and 
the valuation methods of property used in conjunction with these ceilings. 
Methods that base lending decisions on current market value of property 
would tend to increase the sensitivity of credit availability to market 
conditions and could possibly help to create a positive momentum in market 
demand. 
(iv) Depth of the Securitisation Market: The availability of a securitised mortgage 
market facilitates the accompanying advantages and disadvantages.  
(v) Transaction Costs: Transaction costs (e.g. registration fees, agents’ 
commissions, legal fees and sale/transfer taxes) also contribute to differences 
in house price volatility. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
Papers such as Maclennan et al. (1998) argue countries with high transaction 
costs, low leverage ratios, low weight of house ownership and a high proportion of 
fixed-rate mortgages, tend to experience lower volatility, a lower effect of house prices 
on consumption and a reduced role of housing in the transmission mechanism of interest 
rate. Maclennan et al. (1998) also notes how the degree of housing finance integration 
in the capital markets is an important factor in obtaining funds by financial institutions. 
Warnock & Warnock (2008) highlight the importance of the mortgage market in 
generating demand for housing assets. Given the relative size of the asset it follows that 
factors that are associated with a well-functioning housing finance system are those that 
enable the provision of long-term finance. In a cross-sectional analysis for 62 countries 
between 2001 and 2005, the authors find that countries with stronger legal rights for 
borrowers and lenders (through collateral and bankruptcy laws), deeper credit 
information systems, and a more stable macroeconomic environment, have deeper 
housing financial systems. In their study Legal Rights
4
 and Credit Information
5
 
variables are obtained from the “Getting Credit” reports of the World Bank6. The 
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importance of the legal environment and investor protection are also emphasized by 
Lieser & Groh (2010). The authors find that Investor Protection and Legal Framework 
is only second in importance, behind Economic Activity, in their composite index of real 
estate investment attractiveness
7
. Sorensen & Lichtenberger (2007) report that country-
specific factors such as institutional differences that are difficult to measure over time 
play an important role in explaining the differences in mortgage interest rates. The 
authors emphasize the importance of the national legal framework procedure to enforce 
the collateral, the LTV ratios and fiscal factors, in explaining the differences in interest 
rates across EU countries. The expected cost of anticipated losses depends not only on 
the probability of default but also on the cost of the event itself. While the probability of 
default is influenced by many factors (e.g. position in the business cycle, income 
prospects, etc.), the cost of the event itself is also determined by the national legal 
framework and, in particular, by the cost and duration of the procedure to enforce the 
collateral. When some of these costs, such as time and resources, are borne by the 
creditor, banks may include them ex ante into their lending rates. 
 
2.3. EU Tax Systems 
The potential role that tax incentives can play, especially in the context of 
stimulating demand is well documented (e.g. Van den Noord, 2003). A tax system that 
contains generous incentives to house ownership may not only result in a higher steady-
state level of house prices (and an associated misallocation of resources), but also in 
greater volatility of house prices. Poterba (1984, 1991) argues that house price volatility 
arises from the combination of the price-inelastic supply of newly built dwellings and 
the preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. Based on the framework 
developed by Poterba, Van den Noord (2003) argues that the apparent divide between 
large and small countries in the Eurozone appears to be related in part to the differences 
in tax treatment in owner-occupied housing. Income tax systems in the smaller 
Eurozone countries tend to be more conducive to volatile house prices and this may 
have been interacting with the generally higher inflation rates (and hence lower real 
interest rates) observed in these countries since the advent of the common currency. 
Wolswijk (2006) analyses the effects on mortgage debt growth in the EU of 
fiscal instruments. He argues that empirical research on mortgage debt has largely 
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ignored the role of fiscal instruments affecting housing markets and mortgage credit. In 
particular, fiscal measures may affect housing-related decisions via the taxation of 
imputed rents on own houses, the deductibility of mortgage interest payments from 
income tax, and capital gains taxes on the revenue of selling house
8
. Sorensen & 
Lichtenberger (2007) use the tax wedge computed by Van den Noord (2003) to measure 
the effects of fiscal factors on mortgage interest rates and find evidence that fiscal 
factors affect mortgage interest rates. Tax wedge values are presented in Table 3. The 
wedge measures the difference between after-tax and pre-tax mortgage interest rates, 
taking into account any deductibility of mortgage interest payments from taxable 
income, tax credits, and taxation of imputed income from owner-occupied housing. As 
can be seen from Table 3, in most countries a negative tax wedge is found, indicating 
that the tax system provides a subsidy. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
 
3. Institutional Characteristics: Cluster Analysis 
In this section of the paper we use cluster analysis to form groups of countries 
that are broadly homogeneous with respect to the institutional characteristics of their 
housing market, mortgage market and tax system. More specifically, we assign 
categorical numerical variables to each of those characteristics and use a statistical 
clustering algorithm, which determines the groups based on maximising the 
commonality of characteristics for countries within each group and maximising the 
differences between countries that belong to different groups. The selection of variables 
to be included in the analysis is crucial because poor results can derive from misleading 
or exclusion of important variables. The initial choice of variables determines the 
institutional characteristics that will be used to identify the groups of countries. Table 4 
presents the variables included in the formation of groups. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
Cluster analysis is a particularly appropriate procedure when there is a suspicion 
that the sample is not homogeneous. The estimations were obtained using the Ward 
method, based on the square of the Euclidean distance, to the indicated variables and for 
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the EU countries
9
. Figure 1 and Table 5 show the dendrogram obtained based on the 
Ward method and the partition of countries in different groups, respectively
10
. The 
analysis results in five groups of countries comprised as follows: 
 
- Group / Cluster I: Germany and Austria; 
- Group / Cluster II: Italy and Greece; 
- Group / Cluster III: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Portugal; 
- Group / Cluster IV: Denmark, Finland and Sweden; 
- Group / Cluster V: Spain, Ireland and U.K. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Insert Tables 5 & 6 
 
In order to consider whether these characteristics relate to the dynamics of the 
house prices in each market, Table 6 reports the average real rate of house price 
appreciation for each of the markets. In addition, Table 7 and Figure 2 detail the 
institutional characteristics across the different markets. The clusters formed by Greece 
and Italy and Germany and Austria have features of outliers insofar as always appear in 
single clusters. The cluster formed by Italy and Greece is characterized by the existence 
of important legal and institutional barriers to the use of housing as collateral. This is 
most evident in Italy, where possession proceedings by a mortgage lender to obtain the 
title to the property of a borrower in default can take up to 6 years
11
. These legal 
difficulties appear to be associated with a general lack of competition and efficiency in 
the Italian legal system, and perhaps also with lack of rationalisation in the system of 
land title registration. This is corroborated by the legal rights index, which shows that it 
is in these two countries where lenders are protected the least. The Austria and Germany 
cluster is categorised not only by a low rate of owner-occupation but also in that 
mortgage equity extraction is extremely low, transaction costs are high and banks’ 
lending practises (as measured by relatively low LTVs, use of fixed-rate mortgages and 
the use of historical property valuation) are more conservative than in the majority of 
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countries. In addition, securitisation in its purest form when transfer of ownership is 
involved is almost non-existent. 
It can be seen from Table 6 that Austria and Germany are the only two countries 
to have had negative real house price over the 1997-2006 period. This is consistent with 
the premise that countries with large rental market, such as Austria and Germany, are 
less likely to have volatile house prices (e.g. Maclennan et al., 1998). These findings are 
in in stark contrast to those reported with respect to the fourth and fifth clusters. The 
fourth cluster is comprised of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland), whilst the fifth contains Ireland, Spain and the U.K. Both of these clusters 
have a number of share characteristics including; ability to extract equity, greater 
development in securitisation, a generous tax system and lending practices that can be 
characterised as more “aggressive”. In addition, in both groups the market value 
method, high LTV ratios and floating-rate debt is most popular and the protection of 
legal rights of lenders and borrowers and the information system about credit risk of 
potential borrowers are well developed. The main attribute that distinguishes groups IV 
and V is the weight of house ownership and rental market
12
. The adoption of less 
conservative lending practices by banks associated with a generous tax system, may 
lead to greater volatility in housing prices. For Spain, the U.K. and Ireland these factors, 
linked to a small rental market, may contribute to enhanced volatility in house prices. 
These institutional characteristics may aid in explaining why these three countries 
display the highest rate of real house price appreciation across the EU-15 over the 
decade from 1997 to 2006. The final grouping is the cluster formed by the Netherlands, 
Portugal and the francophone axis (France, Belgium and Luxembourg). In contrast to 
the previous group this group have more conservative bank lending practises. These 
markets also have both a higher proportion of home ownership and private rented 
accommodation than the EU-15 average. This offsetting effect, due to a smaller than 
average public rented sector, may explain why these countries have a lower rate of real 
house price appreciation in comparison to Clusters IV and V. 
 
Insert Table 7 
 
Insert Figure 2 
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4. Regime Changes in EU-15 Housing Markets 
The second component of this paper is to test for the presence of structural 
breaks in the housing markets in the EU-15 and to consider whether any breaks 
identified can be linked with changes in policy. We consider possible breaks in both the 
rate of growth in real house prices (iph) and real user cost (ruc). To test for possible 
breaks we adopt the Bai & Perron (1998, 2001, 2003) framework to detect multiple 
structural breaks. Following the approach used in previous papers (e.g. Caporale & 
Grier, 2000; Bai & Perron, 2003; Rapach & Wohar, 2005) we regress each previous 
series on a constant and test for structural breaks in the constant. Consider such a 
regression model with m breaks (m +1 regimes): 
 
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑗−1, … , 𝑇𝑗 ,                                  (1) 
 
for  j = 1, …, m+1, where rt are iph and ruc series in period t and βj  (j=1, …, 
m+1) is the mean of iph and ruc in the jth regime. The m-partition, (T1,…, Tm), 
represents the breakpoints for the different regimes (by convention, T0=0 and Tm+1=T). 
Bai & Perron (1998) explicitly treat these breakpoints as unknown, and estimates of the 
breakpoints are obtained using the least-squares method. Consider the estimation of 
Equation (1) via OLS. For each m-partition, (T1,…,Tm) the least-squares estimates of βj 
are obtained by minimizing the sum of squared residuals: 
 
𝑆𝑇(𝑇1, … , 𝑇𝑚) = ∑ ∑ (𝑟𝑡
𝑇𝑗
𝑡=𝑇𝑗−1+1
− 𝛽𝑗)
2𝑚+1
𝑗=1                              (2) 
 
where, ST represent the sum of squared residuals in m-partition. The regression 
coefficient estimates based on a given m-partition, (T1,…,Tm) are denoted by 
?̂?({𝑇1, … , 𝑇𝑚}), where 𝛽 = (𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑚+1)
′. Substituting these into Equation (2), the 
estimated breakpoints are given by: 
 
(?̂?1, … , ?̂?𝑚) = arg 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑇1,…,𝑇𝑀 𝑆𝑇(𝑇1, … , 𝑇𝑚),                              (3) 
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The set of admissible m-partitions is subject to a set of restrictions. These 
restrictions will be discussed in depth shortly. It is clear from Equation (3) that the 
breakpoint estimators correspond to the global minimum of the sum of squared 
residuals objective function. After estimating the breakpoint, it is straightforward to 
compute the corresponding least-squares regression parameter estimates as ?̂? =
?̂?({𝑇1̂, … , 𝑇?̂?}. Bai & Perron (2001) develop an efficient algorithm for the minimisation 
problem in Equation (3) based on the principle of dynamic programming. 
Bai and Perron (1998) consider testing procedures aimed at identifying the 
number of structural breaks (m) in Equation (1). The authors begin by describing a 
statistic to test the null hypothesis of no structural breaks against the alternative 
hypothesis that there are m=b breaks. Let (T1,…, Tb) be a partition such that Ti = [Tλi] 
(i=1, …, b). Also, define R such that (𝑅𝛽), = (𝛽1 − 𝛽2, … , 𝛽𝑏 − 𝛽𝑏+1). Bai & Perron 
(1998) specify the following statistic test: 
 
𝐹𝑇(𝜆1, … , 𝜆𝑏) =
1
𝑇
(
𝑇−(𝑏+1)2
2𝑏
) ?̂?,𝑅,[𝑅?̂?(?̂?)𝑅,]−1𝑅?̂?,             (4) 
 
where ?̂? = (𝛽1̂, … , 𝛽𝑏+1̂)
, is a vector of regression coefficient estimates, and 
?̂?(?̂?) is a heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix for ?̂?. Bai & Perron (1998) next consider a type of maximum F-
statistic corresponding to Equation (4): 
 
                          𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹𝑇(𝑏) = 𝐹𝑇(𝜆1̂, … , 𝜆?̂?),                                   (5) 
 
where 𝜆1̂, … , 𝜆?̂? minimize the global sum of squared residuals, 𝑆𝑇(𝑇𝜆1, … , 𝑇𝜆𝑏), 
under the restriction that (𝜆1̂, … , 𝜆?̂?)𝜖Λ𝜉, where Λ𝜉 = {(𝜆1, … , 𝜆𝑏); |𝜆𝑖+1 − 𝜆𝑖| ≥
𝜉, 𝜆1 ≥ 𝜉, 𝜆𝑏 ≤ 1 − 𝜉} for some arbitrary positive number, ξ (the trimming parameter). 
Bai & Perron (1998) develop two statistics, what they call the “double maximum” 
statistics, to test the null hypothesis of no structural breaks against the alternative 
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hypothesis of an unknown number of breaks given an upper bound, M. The first “double 
maximum” statistic is given by: 
 
                𝑈𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥1≤𝑚≤𝑀𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹𝑇(𝑚).                                    (6) 
 
The second “double maximum” statistic, WDMax, applies different weights to the 
individual 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐹𝑇(𝑚) statistics so that the marginal p-values are equal across values of 
m (see Bai & Perron, 1998, page 59 for details). Finally Bai & Perron (1998) specify 
what they label the SupFT(l+1\l) statistic to test the null hypothesis of l breaks against 
the alternative hypothesis of l+1 breaks. The procedure begins with the global 
minimized sum of squared residuals for a model with l breaks. Each of the intervals 
defined by the l breaks is then analyzed for an additional break. From all of the 
intervals, the partition allowing for an additional break that results in the largest 
reduction in the sum of squared residuals is treated as the model with l+1 breaks. The 
SupFT(l+1\l) statistic is used to test whether the additional break leads to a significant 
reduction in the sum of squared residuals. Bai & Perron (1998, 2003) derive asymptotic 
distributions for the “double maximum” and SupFT(l+1\l) statistics and provide critical 
values for various values of ξ and M. Although the framework can be adapted to 
explicitly incorporate specific circumstances such as heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation in the residuals (Rapach & Wohar, 2005) we adopt the most general 
specifications that allows for all of these features. 
Bai & Perron (1998) discuss a sequential application of the SupFT(l+1\l) 
statistics –a specific-to-general modeling strategy- as a way to determine the number of 
structural breaks. While Bai & Perron (2001) find that this procedure performs well in 
some settings, on the basis of Monte Carlo simulations, they recommend the following 
strategy to identify the number of breaks. First, examine the “double maximum” 
statistics to determine if any structural break is present. If the “double maximum” 
statistics are significant, then examine the sequence of SupFT(l+1\l) statistics to decide 
on the number of breaks. Bai & Perron (2001) recommend using a trimming parameter 
of least 0.15 (corresponding to M=5) when allowing for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation, and we follow this recommendation for our application. 
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The aforementioned tests are examined using both the growth rate in real house 
prices (iph) and real user cost (ruc). The choice of these two variables is due to the 
depth and availability of information, the degree of housing market representativeness 
and the fact that they tend to capture the impacts of policy changes on the housing 
market. The rationale behind considering the real user cost is that it allows for the 
possibility that mortgage interest payments are tax deductible
13
. Hort (1998) calculates 
the real user cost based on the following formula:  
 
                [(1-ti)*i-π
e
+th+δ]                                                           (7) 
 
where ti is the marginal rate of income tax, in each country, i is the interest rate 
on the interbank money market, πe is the expected inflation rate, approximated by the 
arithmetic mean of the current inflation rate and the previous year inflation rate, th is the 
effective property tax rate and δ the property depreciation rate. The depreciation rate is 
estimated as suggested by Ott (2006) as: 
 
                σt= [GFCFt – (NCSt – NCSt-1)]/NCSt-1                        (8) 
 
where GFCF and NCS refer to Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Net Fixed 
Capital Stock respectively. The sample is not balanced and the depth of each individual 
series depends on the information availability. The house price data was obtained from 
the Bank of International Settlements. For the remaining variables used, inflation is 
based on the respective Consumer Price Index, the marginal rate of income tax and 
property tax details are obtained from the OECD and the GFCF and NCS series were 
obtained from EUROSTAT and the European Mortgage Federation. For the interest rate 
series we use the appropriate 3 month interbank rate as obtained from the ECB. 
Hofmann (2001) for the Eurozone and Hofmann & Mizen (2004) for the U.K. show that 
interbank rates are good proxies of loan rates
14
.  
Tables 8 and 9 present the results of structural breaks for each of the EU-15 
countries. In the case of Germany, Denmark, Italy and Luxembourg “double maximum” 
statistics are not significant at conventional levels. For Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal 
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and Sweden there is only evidence of structural changes in one of the series. The F(2|1) 
statistic shows statistical significance for the iph series’ of Austria and Spain and the 
ruc series of both Finland and the Netherlands, whilst the F(3|2) statistic is statistically 
insignificant. This therefore indicates that two structural breaks (three regimes) are 
present in the series of the countries mentioned. For Belgium, Greece, Ireland and U.K., 
the F(1|0) statistic is statistical significant for both series, while the F(2|1) statistic 
shows statistically insignificant. These results indicate the existence of one structural 
break (two regimes) for these countries. The same conclusion is obtained for the ruc 
series of Austria, Sweden and iph series of Finland and Portugal. 
 
Insert Tables 8 & 9 
 
Maclennan et al. (1998), ECB (2003) and Hilbers et al. (2008), among others, 
illustrate how policy changes may affect the housing market. Figure 3 illustrates some 
of the different channels (e.g. fiscal, prudential, monetary and structural policies) 
through which these effects may flow. Based on the policy changes identified in ECB 
(2003) and Wolswijk (2006), Table 10 presents a list of reforms that have taken place in 
the EU-15 since the mid-eighties. In turn, Table 11 presents the dates of the structural 
breaks in the two series and the 95% confidence intervals. Based on policy changes 
identified in ECB (2003) and Wolswijk (2006) a number of the structural break dates 
are relatively close to points in time when there were changes in policy in housing, 
mortgage financing or tax. As can be seen from Table 11 a majority of the policy 
changes identified can be associated structural regime changes in the housing market. 
The Bai & Perron (1998, 2001 and 2003) methodology, which is based on “a purely 
data-driven procedure” in the selection of structural breaks dates, seems to confirm the 
existence of a linkage between policy changes and structural changes on housing market 
series. 
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
Insert Tables 10 & 11 
 
It should however be noted that not all policy changes have resulted in structural 
breaks on housing market series. As is clear from Figure 3, the housing prices 
developments is the result of a number of factors, and the effects of a particular policy 
does not produce always the desired effects by the authorities because some of them are 
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mitigated by adverse effects caused by other policies. The reasons why reform measures 
may not have caused a structural break can be attributed to a combination of factors: (1) 
a lack of coverage in the series analysed during the emergence of these reforms, (2) 
some of these reform measures may result in a lagged effect, in temporal terms, (3) the 
possible existence of a mismatch between the objectives of the legislator/regulator and 
the practical results of implemented policy, which can lead that final objectives pursued 
by the reform measure be far short of the intended
15
 and (4) the authorities desired 
effects may arise mitigated by adverse effects caused by other policies. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study contributes to the housing literature in two ways: firstly, by studying 
the importance of institutional characteristics associated to rental and home ownership 
market, financial mortgage market and tax system in house prices behaviour and 
secondly, through the endogenous determination of structural breaks in the housing 
market across the EU countries. We develop an analysis of clusters which reveals 
significant differences in terms of institutional characteristics across the EU-15 
countries. Five clusters emerge. The cluster formed by Spain, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, with a less conservative mortgage credit system, a sparse rental market and a 
generous fiscal system. This is not particularly surprising given the high house price 
appreciation observed prior to 2007 in these countries. On the other extreme, a second 
cluster characterized by conservative mortgage credit system, a large rental market and 
a less generous fiscal system is formed by Germany and Austria. In contrast to the 
aforementioned cluster these countries have negative house prices growth. 
The second key aim of this study is the determination of endogenous structural 
breaks for two series relating to the EU-15 housing markets. The fact that many of the 
structural breaks dates are quite close to finance mortgage market, tax system and/or 
rental and house ownership market policy changes suggests that the breaks have a 
policy change cause and that countries have changed policies concurrently. The results 
also show that not all policy changes have resulted in structural breaks. This situation 
can be explained by the fact that not all policy reforms have been structural for housing 
market or have been mitigated by adverse effects caused by other policies. In this way 
17 
 
further studies on house prices determinants should take account the institutional 
characteristics differences across EU countries and the regime changes in housing 
markets, for there is not the risk of obtaining biased results. 
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Table 1: EU-15 Rental Market and House Ownership 
The table shows the weight of house ownership, social rented market and private rented market and other types 
of accommodation, as a percentage of the total dwelling stock, for the EU-15 countries. The values refer to 2007 
and were obtained from Global Property website (www.globalpropertyguide.com) and European Mortgage 
Federation (Hypostat 2008 - A Review of Europe's Mortgage and Housing Markets, November). In the last 
column comes the legal rights index of landlords and tenants. This index gives the amount of control the landlord 
has over his property, measured on a five-point rating scale: strongly pro-landlord = 2; pro-landlord = 1; neutral 
= 0; pro-tenant = -1 and strongly pro-tenant = -2. This index is available on the website of Global Property 
(Global Property Guide's Landlord and Tenant Rating System).  
Country 
Owner 
Occupied (%) 
Social Rented 
(%) 
Private 
Rented (%) 
Other (%) 
Landlord and 
Tenant Rating 
System 
Austria  54 20 18 7 -1 
Belgium  68 7 23 2 -1 
Denmark  52 20 26 2 -2 
      
Finland  57 17 16 10 0 
France  54 21 17 8 -2 
Germany 42 10 48 0 -1 
Greece  81 0 16 3 0 
Ireland 77 9 9 5 -1 
Italy 68 6 18 8 -1 
Luxembourg  70 0 26 4 -2 
Netherlands  54 35 11 0 -1 
Portugal  76 3 21 0 -1 
Spain 82 2 10 6 -2 
Sweden  39 22 22 17 -2 
United Kingdom  67 23 10 0 1 
EU – 15  62.8 13.0 19.4 4.8 - 
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Table 2: Characteristics of Mortgage Markets in EU-15 
The table shows five different characteristics of mortgage market: the interest rate prevailing in the 
mortgage market (fixed or variable), the possibility of equity extraction (mortgage equity withdrawal), the 
maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, the property valuation method and the depth of the securitization 
market, respectively. The values were obtained from the European Mortgage Federation. 
1
F = Fixed mortgage rates (fixed mortgage rate for more than 5 years or at the end of maturity); V = 
Variable mortgage rates (after one year, the mortgage rate is renegotiable) or mixed (fixed rate for more 
than one year to 5 years). The classification is based on the majority of mortgage loans. 
2 
ML = Mortgage 
Lending Value; OM = Open Market Value. 
3
Y = Yes and N = No. 
4
Securitisation was introduced at 
certain stage but remained very limited. 
5 
N = Nonexistence of a legal limit on the LTV ratio. 
6 
The 
maximum LTV is 80%, but tends to be reduced the loans leverage. Guiso et al. (1992) report for example, 
that in Italy possession proceedings by a mortgage lender to obtain the title to the property of a borrower 
in default can take up to 6 years, for what the banks tend to provide customers with a lower leverage, 
which translates into reduced LTV ratios. 
 
Country 
Interest Rate 
Adjustment
1 
Mortgage 
Equity 
Withdrawal
3 
Maximum 
LTV ratio 
(%)
5 
Valuation 
Method
2 
Securitization 
(Mortgage-
baked)
 
     
 
Austria  F N 80-100 ML N
4 
Belgium  F N N OM N
4 
Denmark  F Y 80 ML N 
Finland  V Y N OM N
4
 
France F N 80 OM N
4
 
Germany  F N 80 ML N
4 
Greece V Y N OM N
4
 
Ireland V Y N OM Y 
Italy F N 80-100
6 
OM Y 
Luxembourg  V N N OM N
4
 
Netherlands  F Y N OM Y 
Portugal  V N N OM Y 
Spain V Y 80 OM Y 
Sweden V Y N OM N
4
 
United Kingdom  V Y N OM Y 
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Table 3: Others Institutional Characteristics of Housing Market 
The table presents the “typical” duration of enforcement procedure (in months); the usual length of 
mortgage contracts (in years); the estimated average value of loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the value of 
the Tax Wedge (difference between after-tax and pre-tax mortgage interest rates, taking into account 
deductibility of mortgage interest payments from taxable income, tax credits, and taxation of imputed 
income from owner-occupied housing), respectively for the EU-15. The values were obtained from the 
European Mortgage Federation, except the Tax Wedge, whose values were calculated by the authors 
based on the study of Van den Noord (2003) and information collected from the International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation (2008). 
1
 “Typical Duration (in months) of a forced sale procedure (without incident)” - European Mortgage 
Federation (2007).  
 
Country 
Typical Duration of a 
forced sale 
procedure
1
 (months) 
Usual Length of 
Mortgage Contracts 
(years) 
Estimated Average 
Value of LTV ratio 
(%) 
Tax Wedge
 
Austria 6 25 60 -0.56 
Belgium 18 20 80-85 0 
Denmark 6 30 80 -0.69 
Finland 2-3 15-20 75-80 -0.90 
France 8-18 15-20 78 0 
Germany 6-12 20-30 67 0 
Greece 3-24 15 55 1.58 
Ireland 18-24 20 80 -0.94 
Italy 60-84 5-20 55 -0.53 
Luxembourg 5 20-25 80 -0.96 
Netherlands 4-6 30 87 -2.03 
Portugal 18-30 25-30 83 -0.23 
Spain 7-9 15-20 70 -0.93 
Sweden 4-6 30-45 80-95 -1.26 
United Kingdom 8-12 25 69 0 
 
Table 4: List of Institutional Characteristics Used in the Formation of Clusters 
The following table shows the list of institutional characteristics used in the formation of clusters, divided by three areas of analysis: the rental and house ownership market, financial 
mortgage market and tax system. For each different institutional feature we present the variable definition, a summary of papers highlighting its importance and its source.
 1
Use of 
dummy variables in the formation of cluster. 
 
Variable Authors Definition/Importance Source 
Rental and House Ownership Market 
Landlord and Tenant 
Rating System 
ECB (2003) 
Maclennan et al. (1998) 
Lieser and Groh (2010) 
This index gives the amount of control the landlord has over his property, measured on a 
five-point rating scale: strongly pro-landlord = 2; pro-landlord = 1; neutral = 0; pro-
tenant = -1 and strongly pro-tenant = -2. 
Global Property (Global Property 
Guide’s Landlord and Rating 
System) 
Weight of Rental Market 
ECB (2003) 
Maclennan et al. (1998) 
Weight of Rental Market, as a percentage of the total dwelling stock. 
European Mortgage Federation 
(Hypostat Series) 
Weight of House 
Ownership Market 
ECB (2003) 
Maclennan et al. (1998) 
Weight of House Ownership Market, as a percentage of the total dwelling stock. 
European Mortgage Federation 
(Hypostat Series) 
Transaction Costs 
ECB (2003) 
Maclennan et al. (1998) 
Lieser and Groh (2010) 
Average value of house transaction costs (as a percentage of house value), including 
registration costs, real estate agents’ commissions, legal fees and sale and transfer taxes. 
European Mortgage Federation 
(Study on Cost of Housing in 
Europe – Hypostat Series) 
Financial Mortgage Market 
Interest Rate Adjustement
1 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) 
Maclennan et al. (1998) 
Calza et al. (2007) 
The interest rate prevailing in the mortgage market: 1 = Fixed mortgage rates (fixed 
mortgage rate for more than 5 years or at the end of maturity); 0 = Variable mortgage 
rates (after one year, the mortgage rate is renegotiable) or mixed (fixed rate for more 
than one year to 5 years). The classification is based on the majority of mortgage loans. 
European Mortgage Federation 
(Study on Interest Rate Variability 
in Europe– Hypostat Series) 
Securitization
1 Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) 
Calza et al. (2007) 
Existence and depth of the securitization market. 1 = Nonexistence of securitization or 
proves to be very limited, 0 = otherwise. 
European Mortgage Federation 
(Study on the Efficiency of the 
Mortgage Collateral in the 
European Union– Hypostat 
Series) 
Mortgage Equity 
Withdrawal
1 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) 
Calza et al. (2007) 
Possibility of Equity Extraction ("Mortgage Equity withdrawal"). If liquidity-constrained 
agents could adjust their net borrowing positions or to reﬁnance the terms of their 
existing mortgages according to the changed conditions. 0 = nonused or reduced use. 1 = 
used. 
Property Valuation 
Method
1
 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) 
Usual Property Valuation Method: Mortgage Lending Value or Open Market Value.  
0 = open market value; 1 = mortgage lending value. 
European Mortgage Federation 
(The Valuation of Property for 
Lending Purposes– Hypostat 
Series) 
Weight of Real Estate 
Investment Funds 
Warnock and Warnock 
(2008) 
Weight of Real Estate Investment Funds in Investment Funds Sector.  
EFAMA (Trends in European 
Investment Funds) 
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Table 4: List of Institutional Characteristics Used in the Formation of Clusters (continuation) 
 
 
Variable Authors Definition/Importance Source 
Financial Mortgage Market 
LTV Ratio
 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) 
Sorensen and  
Lichtenberger (2007) 
Calza et al. (2007) 
Estimated average value of loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. 
European Mortgage Federation 
(Study on Cost of Housing in 
Europe – Hypostat Series) 
Credit Info Index 
Warnock and Warnock 
(2008) 
Lieser and Groh (2010) 
Credit Info index measures the depth of credit information about potential borrowers that 
lenders access from standardized and informative sources of credit information. The 
index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit 
information. 
World Bank (Doing Business 
Database) 
Legal Rights for 
Borrowers and Lenders 
Index 
Warnock and Warnock 
(2008) 
Lieser and Groh (2010) 
Legal Rights for Borrowers and Lenders Index measures the strength of legal rights for 
borrowers and lenders. The index is composed of ten categories, seven of which pertain 
to collateral law and three pertain to bankruptcy law. A score 1 is assigned if each 
feature is present in the country, so that the Legal Rights index ranges from 0 to 10 with 
higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand 
access to credit. 
World Bank (Doing Business 
Database) 
Typical Duration of 
Enforcement Procedure 
Sorensen and  
Lichtenberger (2007) 
Lieser and Groh (2010) 
Usual duration of the procedure to enforce the collateral by the lender, in the case of 
borrower default.   
European Mortgage Federation 
(Typical Duration of a forced sale 
procedure (without incident)) 
Tax System 
Tax Wedge Van den Noord (2003) 
Tax wedge measures the difference between after-tax and pre-tax mortgage interest rates, 
taking into account deductibility of mortgage interest payments from taxable income, tax 
credits, and taxation of imputed income from owner-occupied housing. The existence of 
a negative tax wedge indicates that the tax system provides a subsidy. 
International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation (2008) 
Tax on Imputed Rent Maclennan et al. (1998) 
Wolswijk (2006) 
Existence on tax system of Tax on Imputed Rent. (1 = No; 0 = Yes) 
International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation (2008)  
Deductibility of Mortgage 
Interest Payments
1 
Maclennan et al. (1998) 
Wolswijk (2006) 
Possibility of deductibility of mortgage interest payments from taxable income. (1 = No; 
0 = Yes) 
International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation (2008)  
Tax on Capital Gains Maclennan et al. (1998) 
Wolswijk (2006) 
Effective tax rate on capital gains, assuming the validity of the assumptions listed in note 
14 of Table 7. 
International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation (2008) 
Table 5: Clusters  
This table shows the clusters formed by the methods of the farthest neighbour and Ward based on 17 
variables listed in Table 4, relating to the rental and house ownership market, financial mortgage market and 
tax system. Based on the dendrogram obtained we classify EU-15 countries into five groups on the basis of 
these characteristics. # denotes the number of countries groups/clusters. 
 
 “Farthest Neighbour” Method  Ward Method 
# Clusters # Clusters 
3 4 5 6 3 4 5 6 
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Denmark 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Spain 2 3 5 3 3 3 5 4 
Finland 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
France 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Greece 3 4 4 6 2 4 4 5 
Netherlands 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 6 
Ireland 2 3 5 3 3 3 5 4 
Italy 3 4 4 6 2 4 4 5 
Luxembourg 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Portugal 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 6 
United 
Kingdom 
1 3 5 5 3 3 5 4 
Sweden 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
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Table 6: Real House Price Growth Rate (%) 
 
This table shows the real house prices growth rate across EU-15 countries, for three different time periods: 1997 
to 2001, 2002 to 2006 and from 1997 to 2006. 
Country 
Real House Price Growth Rate (%) 
1997-2001 2002-2006 1997-2006 
Austria -18.14% 13.37% -7.20% 
Belgium 27.40% 55.47% 98.07% 
Denmark 23.82% 56.03% 93.20% 
Finland 19.00% 46.25% 74.04% 
France 28.56% 63.57% 110.29% 
Germany -5.32% -6.68% -10.63% 
Greece 28.33% 35.13% 73.40% 
Ireland 65.41% 49.37% 147.07% 
Italy 21.50% 32.02% 60.57% 
Luxembourg 24.36% 39.57% 72.53% 
Netherlands 58.89% 16.25% 84.71% 
Portugal 15.32% -7.06% 7.18% 
Spain 27.25% 70.45% 116.90% 
Sweden 38.76% 45.10% 101.33% 
United Kingdom 51.62% 57.09% 138.19% 
EU-15 (mean) 27.12% 37.73% 73.31 
Source: Authors’ construction using data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
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Table 7: Clusters: Average Values of Variables  
This table presents the average values of the 17 variables listed in Table 5, relating to the rental and house 
ownership market, financial mortgage market and tax system, for each cluster formed. Cluster I: Germany 
and Austria. Cluster II: Italy and Greece. Cluster III: France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands and 
Portugal. Cluster IV: Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Cluster V: Ireland, United Kingdom and Spain. 
Variable Cluster I Cluster II Cluster III Cluster IV Cluster V 
Financial Mortgage Market 
Average Loan-to-Value Ratio (%) 63.50 55.00 82.10 81.66 73.00 
Credit Information
1
 6.00 4.50 3.40 4.33 5.66 
Legal Rights
2 
6.50 3.00 5.60 6.67 8.00 
Interest Rate
3 
1.00 0.50 0.60 0.33 0.00 
Mortgage Equity Withdrawal
4 
0.00 0.50 0.20 1.00 1.00 
Securitization
5 
1.00 0.50 0.60 1.00 0.00 
Weight of Real Estate Investment 
Funds
6 4.18 3.07 10.12 0.00 1.83 
Valuation Method
7 
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 
Enforcement Procedure
8 
7.50 42.75 13.00 4.50 13.00 
Rental and House Ownership Market 
Private Rent (%)
9 
33.00 17.00 19.60 21.33 9.66 
House Ownership (%)
9 
48.00 74.50 64.40 49.33 75.33 
Landlord and Tenant Rating 
System
10 -1.00 -0.50 -1.40 -1.33 -0.66 
Transaction Costs (%)
11 
11.64 16.24 14.90 7.91 8.05 
Fiscal System 
Tax Wedge
12 
-0.28 0.53 -0.64 -0.95 -0.62 
Deductibility of Mortgage Interest 
Payments From Taxable Income
13 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.33 
Tax on Capital Gains
14
 0.00 0.00 4.84 29.47 26.52 
Tax on Imputed Rent
15 
1.00 0.50 0.40 1.00 1.00 
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Table 8 – Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) Test Results: Real House Prices 
Growth Rate  
 
The table presents the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) statistics of multiple structural breaks in the mean of 
the real house prices growth rate (iph), across EU-15 countries. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
a
 One-sided (upper-tail) test of the null hypothesis of 0 breaks 
against the alternative hypothesis of an unknown number of the breaks given an upper bound of 5. 
b
 One-
sided (upper-tail) test of the null hypothesis of 0 breaks against the alternative hypothesis of an unknown 
number of the breaks given an upper bound of 5. 
c 
One-sided (upper-tail) test of the null hypothesis of l 
breaks against the alternative hypothesis of l+1 breaks; F(1\0), l=0; F(2\1), l=1; F(3\2), l=2. – indicates 
that there was no more place to insert an additional break given the minimal length requirement. 
 
Country UDmax
a 
WDmax (5%)
b 
F(1\0)
c 
F(2\1)
c 
F(3\2)
c 
Austria 17.18* 19.74** 17.18* 13.47** 4.36 
Belgium 7.56*** 11.79** 7.33*** 2.37 -- 
Denmark 7.02 9.60 7.02 -- -- 
Finland 36.01* 51.83** 13.59* 6.24 -- 
France 5.53 9.23 5.53 -- -- 
Germany 6.28 9.46 6.28 -- -- 
Greece 9.14** 18.52** 8.80** 3.014 -- 
Ireland 24.62* 45.06** 8.11*** 4.23 -- 
Italy 5.75 7.67 5.75 -- -- 
Luxembourg 5.50 7.41 5.50 -- -- 
Netherlands 6.68 9.40 6.68 -- -- 
Portugal 19.17* 30.36** 10.44** 7.02 -- 
Spain 22.90* 40.98** 22.90* 13.48** 7.20 
Sweden 5.20 7.32 5.20 -- -- 
United 
Kingdom 
16.65* 24.11** 16.65* 4.54 -- 
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Table 9 – Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) Test Results: Real House User Cost 
Rate 
 
The table presents the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) statistics of multiple structural breaks in the mean of 
the real house user cost rate (ruc), across EU-15 countries. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
a
 One-sided (upper-tail) test of the null hypothesis of 0 breaks against the 
alternative hypothesis of an unknown number of the breaks given an upper bound of 5. 
b
 One-sided 
(upper-tail) test of the null hypothesis of 0 breaks against the alternative hypothesis of an unknown 
number of the breaks given an upper bound of 5. 
c 
One-sided (upper-tail) test of the null hypothesis of l 
breaks against the alternative hypothesis of l+1 breaks; F(1\0), l=0; F(2\1), l=1; F(3\2), l=2. – indicates 
that there was no more place to insert an additional break given the minimal length requirement. 
 
Country UDmax
a 
WDmax (5%)
b 
F(1\0)
c 
F(2\1)
c 
F(3\2)
c 
      
Austria 38.14* 83.68** 7.66*** 4.50 - 
Belgium 30.28* 63.61** 7.99*** 2.73 - 
Denmark 4.16 7.66 4.16 - - 
Finland 18.71* 21.86** 18.71* 9.58*** 9.57 
France 3.09 4.22 4.22 - - 
Germany 4.62 9.55 4.62 - - 
Greece 24.40* 44.16** 15.03* 2.29 - 
Ireland 34.55* 58.5** 21.73* 6.46 - 
Italy 7.00 9.72 7.00 - - 
Luxembourg 3.76 5.86 3.76 - - 
Netherlands 36.99* 63.92** 15.33* 8.60*** 8.60 
Portugal 4.32 8.25 4.32 - - 
Spain 6.51 8.51 6.51 - - 
Sweden 168.62* 370.00** 20.30* 3.72 - 
United 
Kingdom 
31.68* 37.65** 16.13* 2.26 - 
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Table 10 – Major Reforms in the EU-15 Housing Markets  
 
The table presents major housing tax and subsidies reforms in the house ownership and rental market and 
major financial deregulation measures in EU-15, starting in the 70’s, which have not resulted in a break of 
the series analyzed . The list of these reforms is based ECB (2003) and Wolswijk (2006). 
Country/Start 
of Series 
Reform Measures 
Germany 
(1975 Q4) 
Interest rate deregulation in the 1970s. 
1983: Introduction of upper limit of 30% in a three-year period on rent increases for sitting 
tenants; rent escalation clauses and rent contracts linked to a price index permitted. 
1987: Abolishment of tax on imputed rent, end of interest deductibility, introduction of tax 
credit for redemption. 
1996: Replacement of fiscal subsidies by non-fiscal subsidy. 
2001: Upper limit on rent increases in a three-year period reduced to 20%. Period of 
giving notice for tenants reduced to three months. 
Austria 
(1986 Q3) 
1980: Liberalization of interest rates. 
1981: Abolition of credit controls. 
1994: “Indicative value rent system” introduced. 
Belgium 
(1981 Q1) 
1984: Rent increases linked to CPI. 
1985-1987: Indexation temporarily suspended. 
1987: Abandoning of interest setting for deposits. 
1991: Freely negotiated new rental fixed term contracts introduced.  
1992: Law permitting an introduction of variable interest rate loans (“referenced loans”) 
and reducing the maximum early repayment fee.  
1990s: Wave of mergers and privatizations in the banking sector. 
Denmark 
(1972 Q1) 
1982: Liberalization of mortgage contracts and interest rate setting. 
Early 1990s: Liberalization of mortgage contract terms and free access to withdrawal of 
net equity in house and flats. 
1997: Adjustable rate loans introduced. 
1998/99: Standard instead of marginal tax rate for interest deductibility. Imputed rent 
substituted by a property tax. 
Spain 
(1987 Q1) 
Early 1980s: Abolition of differences in the activities permitted for different types of 
banks. 
1985: Freely negotiated rents in new agreements. 
1992: Securitization of mortgage loans introduced. 
1995: Minimum lease of five years (at tenant’s option); CPI indexation. One-off updating 
of existing contracts (to be implemented over ten years). 
Finland 
(1978 Q1) 
1993: Substantial reduction of mortgage interest relief tax rate.  
France 
(1980 Q2) 
1984: Bank specialization requirements reduced. 
1987: Elimination of credit controls. 
1997: New contracts liberalised. 
1997/98: Abolishment of mortgage interest tax relief. 
1999: Reform of securitization of mortgage loans. 
1999: Reduced limits on early repayment fees. 
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Table 10 – Major Reforms in the EU-15 Housing Markets (continuation) 
 
Country/Start 
of Series 
Reform Measures 
Greece 
(1994 Q1) 
1985-1992: Gradual liberalization of quantitative constraints, interest rates and other terms 
and conditions on housing loans. 
1997: Freely negotiated rents in new contracts. Minimum duration of contracts of three 
years. 
Netherlands 
(1976 Q4) 
1980: Interest rate deregulation. 
Ireland 
(1975 Q1 and 
1978 Q1) 
1984: Formal guidelines for bank lending to private sector ended. 
1985: Interest rate deregulation. 
1986: Elimination of credit controls. 
1991-1999: Reductions in the primary liquidity ratio from 8% to 2%. 
Italy 
(1988 Q2) 
1983: Interest rate deregulation. 
1983: Credit ceilings eliminated (and temporarily re-imposed in 1986 and 1987). 
1990: Abolition of administrative controls on branching. 
1992: Freely negotiated rents in new agreements. 
1993: Introduction of municipal property tax. 
1994: Separation of long-term and short-term credit institutions abolished. 
1995: Increase of legally maximum LTV from 75% to 80% (can be raised to 100% if other 
guarantees are posted). 
1998: Two types of “free” contracts: freely negotiated at the individual level at the start 
and contracts where yearly rent increases are collectively negotiated by landlords 
and tenants.   
Luxembourg 
(1975 Q1) 
1987: Increases in the rents of dwellings built before 10 September 1944 and clarification 
of the meaning of invested capital for those built after this date. 
1990s: Increase in the amount of mortgage interest deductible from income taxes; 
Registration tax regime made more favourable.  
Portugal 
(1988 Q1) 
1981: Freely negotiated rent contracts for new tenancies introduced (but no indexation 
allowed in these contracts). 
1983: Easing of entry restrictions in the banking and insurance sector. 
1985: Mechanism of updating all rents with CPI; one-off updating of old contracts (but 
still remaining very distant to rents in new contracts). 
1990: Possibility of setting a limit on the duration of rental contracts. 
2006: New Urban Lease Act. 
United 
Kingdom 
(1968 Q2 and 
1973 Q1) 
1980: Removal of credit controls. Banks permitted to lend mortgages. 
1986: Building societies allowed expanding their lending business. 
1987: Securitization introduced. 
1988: Assured tenancy – eviction easier and initial rent and indexation negotiated. 
Sweden 
(1986 Q1) 
1983: Mortgage institutions freer to issue bonds for refinancing of old dwellings. 
1985: Loan ceilings for banks abolished. 
1986: Portfolio regulations on insurance companies dropped. 
1991: Introduction of analytical income tax, reduction of tax rate for interest deduction, 
abolishment of tax on imputed rent, introduction of a property tax.  
 
Table 11 – EU-15 Housing Market Structural Breaks and Policies Measures 
Table 11 shows the number and dates of structural breaks for the mean of real house prices growth rate (iph) and real house user cost rate (ruc), across EU-15 countries. In the determination of 
regime changes is adopted the Bai and Perron (1998 and 2003) methodology. Based on this procedure are estimated the periods of breaks in house market series and their confidence intervals 
for a confidence level of 95%. The institutional factors (policies measures) that explain regime changes are obtained on the website www.globalpropertyguide.com, ECB (2003) and Wolswijk 
(2006). (+) And (-) indicates if on average house prices or interest rate increased (decreased) during the regime period. 
 
Country Series Series Start Breaks Confidence Interval Policies Measures 
Germany 
iph 1975 Q4 No   
ruc 1975 Q4 No   
Austria 
iph 1986 Q3 
1992 Q2 (+) 
 
 
2001 Q4 (-) 
[1987 Q1; 1994 Q4] 
 
 
[1999 Q3; 2003 Q3] 
Prices in Vienna increased nearly 150% during this period, due to positive developments 
in Eastern Europe, increased immigration and the expansion of home ownership. 
Prudential reforms, capital requirements tightened and end of interest rate cartel. 
Beginning of privatization of state-owned banks. Partial liberalization of new tenancies. 
End of the immigration flow, reducing the optimism of economic agents and an over-
supply in housing market. 
ruc 1986 Q3 1998 Q3 (-) [1998 Q1; 2005 Q4] Eurozone process adhesion. 
Belgium 
iph 1981 Q1 2003 Q1 (+) [2001 Q1; 2007 Q2] 
High Growth of Housing Market caused by increased competition among banks and by 
interest rate reduction. 
ruc 1981 Q1 2003 Q1 (-) [2000 Q1; 2008 Q2] Eurozone process adhesion. 
Denmark 
iph 1971 Q1 No   
ruc 1972 Q1 No   
Spain 
iph 1987 Q1 
1988 Q1 (+) 
 
1997 Q4 (+) 
[1987 Q1; 1989 Q4] 
  
   [1995 Q1; 2001 Q2] 
Interest rate liberalization. Savings banks allowed opening branches outside their home 
regions. 
Eurozone process adhesion, high economic growth and boom in demand for second homes 
in coastal areas. 
ruc 1987 Q1 No   
Finland 
iph 1978 Q1 
1988 Q4 (+) [1985 Q3; 1990 Q2] Abolition of interest rate controls and government withdrew guidelines on mortgage 
lending.  
ruc 1978 Q1 
1988 Q4 (-) 
1996 Q2 (-) 
[1985 Q3; 1990 Q2] 
[1995 Q4; 2006 Q4] 
Abolition of interest rate controls and government withdrew guidelines on mortgage 
lending.  
Eurozone process adhesion and gradual liberalization of rent controls (rents are practically 
free from public control). 
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Table 11 – EU-15 Housing Market Structural Breaks and Policies Measures (continuation) 
Country Series Series Start Breaks Confidence Interval Policies Measures 
France 
iph 1980 Q2 No   
ruc 1980 Q2 No   
Greece 
iph 1994 Q1 
1999 Q1 (+) [1998 Q4; 2002 Q4] Eurozone process adhesion, liberalization of mortgage refinancing and expansion of non-
specialized commercial banks into mortgage lending. 
ruc 1994 Q1 
1999 Q1 (-) [1998 Q4; 2002 Q4] Eurozone process adhesion, liberalization of mortgage refinancing and expansion of non-
specialized commercial banks into mortgage lending. 
Netherlands 
iph 1976 Q1 No   
ruc 1976 Q4 
1994 Q4 (-) 
 
 
 
2002 Q1 (+) 
[1993 Q4; 1999 Q2] 
 
 
  
[2001 Q4; 2003 Q4] 
In this period there was an increase of 78% of real house price. This is partly due to the 
liberalization of the mortgage market with relaxation of the lending criteria, increasing 
competition of the banks, liberalization of more expensive segment of rental market and full 
deductibility of mortgages interest payments from taxable income. The proportion of loans 
with LTV ratios greater than 100% increased from 15% in 1990 to a value exceeding 70% in 
2001. 
Fiscal Change: Reduced tax relief for interest payments and restricted it to principal 
dwelling and expansion of the tax rate on capital gains. 
Ireland 
iph 1975 Q1 1994 Q3 (+) [1991 Q2; 2006 Q4] 
During this period the house prices increased 179% in real terms. The liberalization of the 
mortgage market with interest rate deregulation, the end of controls/regulations on rent 
contracts and tax changes (favoring home ownership against the rents) help explain prices 
growth in the period. 
ruc 1978 Q1 1998 Q4 (-) [1997 Q1; 2000 Q3] 
Eurozone process adhesion and tax changes: abolished property tax and halved capital gains 
tax. 
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Table 11 – EU-15 Housing Market Structural Breaks and Policies Measures (continuation) 
Country Series Series Start Breaks Confidence Interval Policies Measures 
Italy 
iph 1988 Q2 No   
ruc 1988 Q2 No   
Luxembourg 
iph 1975 Q1 No   
ruc 1975 Q1 No   
Portugal 
iph 1988 Q1 1992 Q1 (-) [1989 Q3; 1996 Q4] 
Wolswijk (2006) refers the process of privatization as one of the policies measures that 
explain this break that results in the liberalization of interest rates, abolition of credit 
controls and credit guidelines, liberalization of investment service and legislation of entry, 
branching, specialization and segmentation restrictions. 
ruc 1988 Q1 No   
United 
Kingdom 
iph 1968 Q2 1992 Q4 (-) [1990 Q4; 1994 Q3] Crisis of Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Financial Crisis. 
ruc 1973 Q1 1992 Q3 (-) [1992 Q1; 1997 Q1] Crisis of Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Financial Crisis. 
Sweden 
iph 1986 Q1 No   
ruc 1986 Q1 1996 Q1 (-) [1992 Q4; 1998 Q2] 
Measures to increase competition among mortgage finance institutions, banks and other 
credit institutions in the 80's have resulted in banking crisis of 1991-93 with negative 
consequences on house prices. 
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Figure 1: Dendogram: Ward Method  
Figure 1 shows the dendrogram obtained from hierarchical cluster analysis for all institutional features 
variables. The dendograms obtained using the "farthest neighbour" and Ward agglomeration methods, 
suggest groups partition very similar, so we only present one of the agglomeration methods, the Ward 
method. 
 
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 
 
      C A S E       0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label        Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  Spain          5   ─┬─────────┐ 
  Ireland       10   ─┘         ├───────┐ 
  United Kingdom14   ───────────┘       ├─────────────────────────────┐ 
  Finland        6   ─┬─────┐           │                             │ 
  Sweden        15   ─┘     ├───────────┘                             │ 
  Denmark        4   ───────┘                                         │ 
  Germany        1   ───────┬───────────────────────┐                 │ 
  Austria        2   ───────┘                       │                 │ 
  Greece         8   ─────────────────┬─────┐       ├─────────────────┘ 
  Italy         11   ─────────────────┘     │       │ 
  Belgium        3   ─────┬───┐             ├───────┘ 
  France         7   ─────┘   ├─────────┐   │ 
  Luxembourg    12   ─────────┘         ├───┘ 
  Netherlands    9   ───────────┬───────┘ 
  Portugal      13   ───────────┘ 
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Figure 2: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis: Characterization of Clusters with 
Standardized Variables 
Figure 2 presents a plot with standardized values of institutional variables used on hierarchical cluster 
analysis, for the five groups of countries formed. The definition of each variable appears in Table 5. 
 
 
Note: Cluster I: Germany and Austria. Cluster II: Italy and Greece. Cluster III: France, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and Portugal. Cluster IV: Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Cluster V: Ireland, United Kingdom and 
Spain. 
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Standardized Variables 
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Figure 3 – Key Policy Relationship in Housing Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hilbers et al. (2008) 
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Endnotes: 
                                                 
1
 Those characteristics are related to several aspects such as the prevailing interest rate in the 
mortgage market; the possibility of Equity withdrawal; the level of LTV (Loan-to-Value) ratios; 
accepted property valuation methods and the availability of asset securitization. 
2
 McCrone & Stephens (1995) emphasise the importance of legal and institutional barriers in the 
use of housing as collateral, arguing that despite convergence pressures, differences in housing and 
financial market institutions across EU countries remained substantial.  
3
 The index is available from www.globalpropertyguide.com and takes into consideration the 
following elements: (1) If rents can be freely agreed between landlord and tenant, (2) whether the 
landlord collect security and rental deposits, and are the amounts limited, (3) the duration of the 
contracts is freely chosen by the parties and can either the landlord or tenant terminate early, and 
what are the penalties for early termination and finally does the tenant have a right to extend, (4) 
whether the court system works well and how long can it take to evict a tenant for non-payment of 
rent. This index gives the amount of control the landlord has over his property, measured on a five-
point rating scale: strongly pro-landlord = 2; pro-landlord = 1; neutral = 0; pro-tenant = -1 and 
strongly pro-tenant = -2. 
4
 Legal Rights for borrowers and lenders is composed of ten categories, seven of which pertain to 
collateral law and three pertain to bankruptcy law. A score 1 is assigned if each feature is present in 
the country, so that the Legal Rights index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating that 
collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit. 
5
 Credit Info index measures the depth of credit information about potential borrowers that lenders 
access from standardized and informative sources of credit information. The index ranges from 0 to 
6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information. 
6
 Available at www.doingbusiness.org. A complete description of the indexes and their components 
is available in www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/GettingCredit.aspx. 
7
 Global Real Estate Investment Attractiveness Index (Global REIA Index). 
8
 Lieser & Groh (2010) also note the importance of capital gains taxation and the deductibility of 
mortgage interest on income tax in the context of their index of Real Estate Investments 
Attractiveness. 
9
 The variables included in the analysis are standardised. When cluster analysis would have been 
applied without a prior standardization, any distance measure would reflect the weight of the 
variables that have higher values and greater dispersion. 
10
 As a robustness test we also estimated the clusters using the farthest neighbour method. The 
results are do not differ from those from the Ward approach and are available from the authors on 
request. 
11
 Guiso et al. (1992) argue that these long standing restrictions are a major reason why LTV ratios 
in Italy have historically been less than 50% and why the ratio of mortgage-debt-to-GDP is so low. 
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12
 Denmark is a slight outlier in some respects. Despite its high average LTVs, it shows a 
preference for fixed-rate mortgages whilst historical valuations are used for collateral purposes and 
there is a low weight of securitization. 
13
 As mentioned by Wolswijk (2006) “after-tax mortgage interest rates have an effect on mortgage 
debt growth, indicating a potential role of interest deductibility as a policy instrument to influence 
mortgage developments. All countries, apart from France, Germany and the U.K., in 2003 allowed 
income tax deductibility of mortgage interest payment, with relevant marginal tax rates ranging 
from 29 percent (Finland) to 52 per cent (the Netherlands)”. 
14
 As our analysis stops prior to the financial crisis the disconnect that emerged with the interbank 
market does not come into play. 
15
 The New Urban Lease Act (Novo Regime de Arrendamento Urbano –“NRAU”) in Portugal is an 
example of a legislative reform where the results fell far short of the desired effect.  
